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Claude Code allowlist files leak secrets in 1,122 public GitHub copies

Apiiro said 1,122 public .claude/settings.local.json files on GitHub hold passwords or keys after developers approved Claude Code commands with “don’t ask again.”

What's new
  1. New headline Was: “Claude Code's “Don't Ask Again” File Exposes Passwords and Keys in 1,122 Public Copies on GitHub”
  2. Our desk filed its story
  3. apiiro.com is now reporting this
  4. New headline Was: “Claude Code settings file put secrets in 1,122 public GitHub copies, Apiiro says”

Software security firm Apiiro said public GitHub copies of Anthropic’s Claude Code project settings file contain passwords, API keys and other credentials that developers approved when they chose not to be asked again1,2.

The researchers said 1,122 of 104,185 public.claude/settings.local.json files, in 103,617 repositories, held at least one secret, totaling 1,379 distinct secrets1,2. They reported notifying affected organizations on Nov. 2 and 3, 2026, and said one company confirmed a key had been live2.

By default, Claude Code asks before running most shell commands1. If a user selects “Yes, and don’t ask again,” the tool writes an allow rule in.claude/settings.local.json1,2. When the rule is an exact command rather than a pattern, any password or token in that command is stored in plain text1,2. Apiiro said it reproduced the behavior with Anthropic’s latest models, including Opus 5.5 and Fable 5.11,2.

Claude Code tries to keep the file out of git by adding it to the user’s global git excludes the first time it is written in a repository, according to Anthropic’s settings documentation as cited by both reports1,2. That setting stays on one computer and is not added to the project’s.gitignore, so it does not travel with clones or later commits1,2. In 539 of 1,105 repositories the researchers traced, a commit listing Claude as a co-author changed the file1,2.

More than a third of the secrets opened a database directly, including 379 database passwords, the researchers said1,2. Other counts included 43 SSH logins for public servers, 42 tokens for GitHub, GitLab and npm, and 23 AWS keys1,2. They said 63 organizations, mostly software companies, owned files with secrets1,2. As of Nov. 2, 2026, every file with a secret still sat on its repository’s default branch, and in the median such repo the file had been committed for at least 217 days1,2.

Deleting the current file does not clear git history or forks1,2. Older versions held 734 additional secrets across 509 repositories that were not in any current copy, and 211 forks of 74 repositories carried the same secrets1,2. Counting history, the shared.claude/settings.json file teams commit on purpose, and saved agent chat logs, Apiiro’s total was 2,539 secrets across 1,994 repositories1,2.

Of 16 coding agents whose documentation the researchers compared, Claude Code was the only one confirmed to save the full approved command in a project file by default1,2. Common scanners missed many cases: of 1,122 files with a secret, gitleaks flagged 564 and TruffleHog 643, and neither flagged 215, often because a password sat inside a command rather than a known key format1,2.

Apiiro recommended rotating every credential the files had ever held, then untracking the local file, adding it to the repo.gitignore, and approving patterns instead of literal commands with secrets1,2. Users had reported the storage of approved commands with tokens in GitHub issues as early as August 2025; the researchers said related reports were closed by an automated bot without a reply from Anthropic1,2. Anthropic’s response, if any, was not in the two reports1,2.

Sources

  1. The Hacker NewsClaude Code's “Don't Ask Again” File Exposes Passwords and Keys in 1,122 Public Copies on GitHub
  2. apiiro.comClaude Code's "Don't Ask Again" exposes passwords in 1,122 public GitHub files

How it’s being reported

2 sources

First reported by The Hacker NewsThe Hacker News

Where they agree

  • Selecting “don’t ask again” can write the full command, including secrets, into .claude/settings.local.json.
  • 1,122 public copies held at least one secret among 104,185 files found.
  • Global git exclude does not add the file to a project .gitignore.
  • Rotate credentials before cleanup because history and forks retain copies.

Side by side

Each outlet's article broken down by our newsroom, in our own words. To read what they wrote, use the button under each one.

The Hacker NewsThe Hacker News

Claude Code's “Don't Ask Again” File Exposes Passwords and Keys in 1,122 Public Copies on GitHub

How approving an exact command writes secrets into .claude/settings.local.json and why git exclude does not travel with the repo.

Summarizes Apiiro’s count of secrets in public Claude Code settings files and the “don’t ask again” allow-rule mechanism.

Leaves out Named organization examples from Apiiro’s table of strongest cases.

How approving an exact command writes secrets into .claude/settings.local.json and why git exclude does not travel with the repo.

What it reports

  • Selecting “Yes, and don’t ask again” can save the full command, including secrets, in .claude/settings.local.json.
  • Apiiro counted 1,122 public copies with at least one secret and 1,379 distinct secrets.
  • Claude Code adds the file to a user’s global git excludes, not the project .gitignore.
  • In 539 of 1,105 traced repos, a Claude co-authored commit changed the file.
  • Researchers advised rotating credentials before cleanup; related GitHub issues were closed without an Anthropic reply.

Leaves out Named organization examples from Apiiro’s table of strongest cases.

apiiro.comapiiro.com

Claude Code's "Don't Ask Again" exposes passwords in 1,122 public GitHub files

Scale of the GitHub census, types of credentials, and that Claude Code is the only agent of 16 confirmed to save the full approved command in a project file by default.

Primary research post with GitHub search counts, secret types, scanner gaps, and disclosure to affected organizations.

Scale of the GitHub census, types of credentials, and that Claude Code is the only agent of 16 confirmed to save the full approved command in a project file by default.

What it reports

  • Researchers found 104,185 public copies of the local settings file in 103,617 repositories.
  • Including git history, shared settings.json, and agent logs, they counted 2,539 secrets in 1,994 repos.
  • 63 organizations were affected; one notified firm confirmed a key was still live.
  • gitleaks and TruffleHog missed many password-in-command cases; 215 of 1,122 files were flagged by neither.
  • No credential was tested for validity; “real secret” meant a known key format or a password next to a public host.