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Tailscale says SSH bugs can raise privileges; patch due Tuesday
Tailscale said privilege-escalation bugs in Tailscale SSH are serious and it aims to ship a patched client by Tuesday, after researchers reported 11 issues in lab tests.
- BleepingComputer is now reporting this
- New headline Was: “Unpatched Tailscale SSH Flaws Could Let a Hacked Device Reach Root on Other Servers”
- Our desk filed its story
- New headline Was: “Researcher says Tailscale SSH can turn one hacked node into root”
Tailscale said Monday it is investigating privilege-escalation bugs in Tailscale SSH and targeting a patched client by the end of Tuesday, Oct. 27, after researchers reported a cluster of issues in lab tests of recent software1,2.
Cyberdione Labs founder Erica Windisch said the team found 11 flaws, collectively labeled Tailworm, in Tailscale 1.104.2 and the self-hosted headscale control server 0.29.5, and that the findings were reproduced on unmodified released builds1,2.
BleepingComputer reported the most severe finding involves Tailscale SSH, an embedded SSH server that can run as root, and unix-socket forwarding that can let an already approved session replace, dial or delete privileged resources1.
The Hacker News said the path described in the research would require Tailscale SSH with port forwarding enabled and an attacker who already controls a device that access rules allow to reach the target2.
Tailscale said most of the SSH issues it has identified concern privilege escalation, and that in some cases a user already authorized to connect over Tailscale SSH may be able to act beyond their configured local user, including potentially gaining elevated privileges1,2.
The company called the issues serious, said exploitation depends on granted permissions, system configuration and other conditions, and said it is still verifying scope1,2.
While preparing a fix, Tailscale recommended reviewing SSH access policies, tightening access to sensitive systems, and disabling SSH forwarding if it is not needed by setting TS_SSH_DISABLE_FORWARDING=1 in the tailscaled environment and restarting the service1.
The Hacker News noted that when the research first appeared, Tailscale had issued no security bulletin or CVE and no fixed version, and that the write-up described lab tests rather than attacks on real networks2.
Tailscale said it plans a security advisory with confirmed vulnerabilities, affected versions and configurations after the patch ships, followed by a technical write-up1,2.
Sources
How it’s being reported
2 sourcesFirst reported by
The Hacker News
Tailscale warns of SSH flaws allowing root privilege escalation
Eleven lab-verified flaws branded Tailworm, with the most severe in Tailscale SSH socket forwarding running as root.
Reports that Cyberdione Labs found 11 unpatched issues, including Tailscale SSH unix-socket forwarding that could yield root on a target, and that Tailscale planned a fix by Tuesday.
Leaves out That Tailscale is not recommending everyone disable Tailscale SSH.
Unpatched Tailscale SSH Flaws Could Let a Hacked Device Reach Root on Other Servers
Post-compromise path from one hacked device to root on other Tailscale SSH hosts, with no bulletin or CVE at first publication.
Earlier report that a compromised device on a tailnet could reach root on other reachable servers; later update that Tailscale confirmed privilege-escalation issues and expected a patch within a day.
Leaves out The full 11-issue component table and the TS_SSH_DISABLE_FORWARDING workaround listed by BleepingComputer.
Where they agree
- Researchers reported Tailscale SSH issues that can escalate privileges for an already authorized user or device.
- Tailscale called the issues serious and said it was preparing a patched client around Oct. 27.
- Exploitation is described as needing existing access, not an unauthenticated internet-facing break-in.
Where they differ
How many distinct bugs and how severe the root path is