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Browsers distrust eMudhra root after eight of its intermediate CA keys prove weak
Google and Mozilla blocked eight eMudhra intermediate certificate authorities whose private keys were weak enough to recover and are dropping the root above them; eMudhra says no certificates came from the eight and its systems were not breached.
- Our desk updated its story
- Our desk updated its story
- Mint is now reporting this
- New headline Was: “mitmproxy adds option to sign certificates with compromised eMudhra CA key”
- Our desk updated its story
3 earlier updates
- New headline Was: “mitmproxy adds --emudhra option”
- Our desk filed its story
- github.com is now reporting this
Primary sources: Google Chrome and Android Security Teams post (Oct. 20, 2026), Mozilla Security Blog post (Oct. 20, 2026), eMudhra statement (updated Oct. 21, 2026), Cisco Talos threat advisory (Oct. 21, 2026)
Google's Chrome and Android security teams and Mozilla said they blocked eight intermediate certificate authorities run by eMudhra after a security researcher reported their private keys were compromised, and both are removing the root that signed them1,2. The Indian certificate authority said it revoked all eight on Monday, Oct. 193,5.
Google said the keys were generated with too little randomness, which let anyone forge trusted HTTPS certificates for any website against clients that still trust those CAs1. Cisco Talos said browser blocks do not reach every program, because some software that checks TLS certificates may not consult revocation lists, and named VPNs as one example4.
eMudhra said the intermediates were created in a key generation ceremony on April 30, 2025, and that a key wrap and unwrap step produced a second, weak set of keys, which were the ones published to browser root stores3. Talos gave the same account and said several of the private keys evaluated to single- and double-digit integers4. eMudhra said the flaw went undetected for about 18 months through two independent audit cycles and that it has not confirmed the exact root cause3.
Talos said six of the eight were TLS intermediates, blocked by Chrome, Mozilla and Apple, and two were code-signing intermediates blocked by Microsoft4. eMudhra describes all eight as part of its Global TLS business3.
Google said Chrome blocked the keys through a CRLSet update at 19:45 UTC on Saturday, Oct. 17, with no browser update or restart needed, and Android devices got an equivalent update through Google Play Services around 22:00 UTC on Monday1. Because no certificates chaining to the six affected intermediates had been logged to Certificate Transparency before the block, none could have been used against clients that enforce it, including Chrome, Google said1.
Mozilla said its OneCRL revocation list blocked the certificates for Firefox users on standard settings within three hours of the report, that it released Firefox 158.0.1, ESR 115.43.1 and ESR 153.5.1 on Tuesday, Oct. 20, for users whose settings stopped that update, and that NSS 3.131.1 removes the root2.
Google said it has removed emSign ECC Root CA - G3 from the Chrome Root Store, a change expected to reach all devices on the morning of Tuesday, Oct. 27, Pacific time1. It said some legitimate certificates under that root will stop working, that site operators using it must install a certificate from another hierarchy, and that it is investigating whether eMudhra's remaining CA certificates should stay trusted1.
eMudhra said seven of the eight intermediates were never used in production, the eighth had issued no certificates, and the root distrust affects one customer ecosystem in the United States3. "No certificates had been issued from any of them, our infrastructure was not compromised, and no data was breached," the company said3.
The sources disagree on when the problem was first reported. Google said its root program received the report at 18:05 UTC on Saturday, Oct. 17, which was 11:35 p.m. that day in India, and Mozilla put its receipt at 20:06 UTC the same day1,2. eMudhra said it was made aware late in the evening of Oct. 18, India time, about a day after Google's stated time, and that the researcher notified Apple, Google, Microsoft and Mozilla at the same time3. An earlier Oct. 20 update on eMudhra's own page repeated Mozilla's Oct. 17 date without comment3.
Talos said it had seen no malicious use of the certificates as of 10 a.m. ET on Wednesday, Oct. 21, and recommended updating software and trust stores as fixes become available4. It said the Go team released Go 1.27.3 and 1.26.10, which reject chains containing the eight keys, under CVE-2026-1119434. eMudhra said it knows of no evidence the weak keys were recovered or exploited before disclosure3. Mint reported that Cloudflare found no active exploitation on its own services and updated its WARP, 1.1.1.1 and cloudflared software5.
Sources
- Google Chrome and Android Security TeamsProtecting Chrome and Android Users from Compromised eMudhra Intermediate CA Certificates
- Mozilla Security BlogProtecting Firefox users following the compromise of eMudhra intermediate certificates
- eMudhraeMudhra Statement on Recent Certificate Security Incident
- Cisco TalosCompromised eMudhra intermediate certificates
- MintGoogle, Apple and Mozilla block 8 eMudhra certificates over weak keys: What users need to know
Read the original at Google Chrome and Android Security Teams ↗
How it’s being reported
5 versions from 1 sourceShow all
Protecting Chrome and Android Users from Compromised eMudhra Intermediate CA Certificates
How fast Chrome blocked the keys and why Certificate Transparency kept Chrome users safe.
Google's own account of the report it received, Chrome's CRLSet block, the Android update and its removal of the eMudhra ECC root.
Leaves out Does not explain how the keys came to be weak or say which customers are affected.
Protecting Firefox users following the compromise of eMudhra intermediate certificates
That its OneCRL block reached standard Firefox installs in under three hours.
Mozilla's account of its OneCRL block, the Firefox point releases and the root removal from NSS.
Leaves out Does not address how the keys were weakened or whether anyone exploited them.
eMudhra Statement on Recent Certificate Security Incident
That no certificates came from the eight intermediates and that its systems and data were not breached.
20 and 21, on the weak keys, its timeline and who it says is affected.— eMudhra
The certificate authority's running statement, updated Oct. 20 and 21, on the weak keys, its timeline and who it says is affected.
Leaves out Does not reconcile its Oct. 18 awareness date with the Oct. 17 report times the browser makers give.
Compromised eMudhra intermediate certificates
Exposure beyond browsers, in VPNs, build systems and embedded devices.
Cisco's threat-intelligence unit lists the eight certificates and warns that software outside the browsers may still trust them.
Leaves out Does not give the times the browser makers received the report.
Google, Apple and Mozilla block 8 eMudhra certificates over weak keys: What users need to know
The response from Google, Apple, Mozilla and Cloudflare and advice for ordinary users.
The Indian business paper's explainer on the blocks, Cloudflare's response and what users should do.
Leaves out Does not carry eMudhra's own account of the cause or its claim that only one customer is affected.